International Law from a Functional Perspective by Barkun, Michael
INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM A
FUNCTIONAL PERSPECTIVE
Michael Barkun*
T H E analysis of international law in functional terms is an accepted
device of acknowledged utility. It amounts, most of the time,
to the division of international relations into two quite different
segments: the first corresponding to what we usually mean by the
domain of "national interest," however that ambiguous phrase is
defined; the second encompassing subjects of primarily social,
economic, or scientific import, which by definition do not readily
engage the survival sense of governments.' The principle conclusion
drawn from this distinction is that international law operates most
easily in the second area. Expressed somewhat differently, states are
most amenable to regulation in those segments of their activities which
they do not choose to define as central to their survival and which are
most easily transposed into the terminology of some technical
expertise.
At the outset, it will be helpful to make three brief comments to
orient the discussion to the functionalist approach to international law.
First, functionalism has the advantage of directing our attention away
from the glamorous, but theoretically less important realm of major
international crises, to the rather prosaic, but more significant,
questions of workable international regulation. Second, despite its
utility as a means for asserting research priorities, it is only
occasionally a genuine form of explanation.' Broadly speaking,
functional explanation seeks to account for the persistence of a
pattern of behavior by demonstrating the ways in which it in turn
contributes to the persistence of other activities in its environment. The
application of functionalist views to international law is sometimes
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'Falk, New Approaches to the Study of International Law, in NEw APPROACHES TO
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 357, 373-75 (M. Kaplan ed. 1968).
2Flanigan & Fogelman, Functionalism in Political Science, in FUNCTIONALISM IN THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES -, Ill-I15 (D. Martindale ed. 1965). In its widest range, functionalism means that in
analyzing phenomena, a political scientist will be concerned with functions or purposes served by
the phenomena among other things. It is treated as one factor among many relevant ones. The
more narrow view is that the approach of functionalism is the most promising.
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exemplified through a demonstration of the social and economic
interdependence of nations and the resulting need for the control of
activities across political boundaries. But more often "functionalism"
simply means that international law is conceived to perform service in
some distinct subject areas but not in others. In other words,
functionalism is a means of description, not of explanation. Third,
however functionalism is understood, its application to international
law usually proceeds in a kind of vacuum, isolated from any systematic
concern for other types of legal systems. The frequent failure to deal
comparatively with international and non-international legal systems in
large part has resulted from traditional forms of naive comparison
which see international law either as a gigantic magnification of
municipal law or as an area so radically different that the very term
"law" cannot legitimately be applied to it.3
Any exploration of international legal functions is but another way
of posing a familiar question, "What is the relevance of international
law?" If the comments below rely on any single assumption, it is that
this question cannot be approached without simultaneously asking
"What is the relevance of law qua law?" At the international level we
admittedly deal with a singular manifestation of legal order, yet this
manifestation also bears some kinship to law in other, more complex
settings. We shall, consequently, begin by considering the functions law
can and has performed, and then move to a consideration of the
relationships between legal functions and their social and political
milieu.
I. FUNCTIONS LAW CAN AND HAS PERFORMED
The "relevance" of law has inevitably to do with the problem of
"fit," that is, the degree of congruence between rules of behavior and
empirically observed patterns of behavior. 4 An irrelevant legal system
will succumb to either of two extreme situations: it will run too far into
a utopian future too fast, asking more of mere mortals than they wish
to give; or it will lag woefully behind, continuing to deal piously with
problems that in a changed society simply no longer exist. In the former
situation, the law has been utilized for innovative purposes but it has
been unable to wrench social actors from their accustomed modes of
UThe discussion which follows necessarily reflects these considerations, even if, in the end, the
subject remains a no less perplexing one than it did in the beginning.
'Deutsch, The Probability of International Law, in THE RELEVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW:
ESSAYS IN HONOR OF LEO GROSS 57, 71 (K. Deutsch & S. Hoffmann ed. 1968).
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behavior. Thus, the result is a problem of social engineering. The latter
case, far more common in international law, reduces law to irrelevance
because the rules envision one set of problems and the environment
produces another. In such a circumstance it may not even be fair to say
that law has failed to regulate conduct, for it has not made the attempt.
Between these extremes lies a zone of optimal time-lag, where the
content of legal rules both incorporates the values and expectations of
social actors and subtly diverges from them. Obviously, a set of rules
perfectly responsive to observed behavior regulates nothing, for every
deviation automatically becomes incorporated into the rule system.
International law has wrestled with all of these problems. The
literature reflects an anguished preoccupation with the demands of
reform-the desire to free international relations from war and
injustice. The anguish results from the perceived urgency of the task,
its manifest difficulty, and the conflict between it and another central
enterprise-that of partially closing the excessive gap between
international rules and international conduct. This complex dilemma
lies at the center of functional analyses. For example, emphasis of
functional approaches on problems of international economic growth
and improved social welfare reflects reformist aims. The selection of
these problems, on the other hand, involves a retreat from problems of
the control of force and thus leaves untouched the great normative
questions of war and peace. The more mundane business of reducing
time-lag, essential in a decentralized and heavily customary system,
often carries with it the need to bring rules in line with practices that
are perceived to be politically undesirable, morally repugnant, or both.
Should the scope and depth of international law be expanded for their
own sakes or only when the substance of rules meets external moral
criteria? If the development of an international law is an automatic
process over which no one has very much control, can we identify areas
of processes in which desirable marginal adjustments can be made? The
horns of the dilemma are made no less sharp by the knowledge that it
is easier to adjust law to behavior than the other way around.
The acuteness with which the problem is felt, at least by scholars,
frequently derives from the view that law has some specific,
determinate function to perform in all human societies. That function
has been identified with the attainment of "justice," however defined,
or with the realization of some particular distribution of values; in any
case, with the attainment of a desired end-state for the society.
Alternatively, law has been conceived to be a way of dealing with
trouble and troublemakers, or freeing society from disruptive forces.
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This is particularly true of the literature of international law,
preoccupied as it often is with the problem of controlling or eliminating
force in relations between states.
In fact, there is no reason to regard law as unifunctional.
Furthermore, there are persuasive reasons, drawn from different types
of societies, for believing that law should be regarded as
multifunctional. There is also reason to believe that the functions
performed vary systematically with the complexity of the society. Law,
conceived as broadly as possible, might perform at least four different
functions. These functions are listed below in order of the greater
amount of resources necessary for their performance.
1. To achieve order and predictability in the relationships among
social actors. I have viewed this as a product of the ability of legal rules
and concepts to structure human perceptions,5 or, to use Gidon
Gottlieb's useful phrase, legal rules operate as a mode for "decision
guidance." When interacting individuals share the same set of rules,
they can both perceive the world and make decisions in a manner which
produces behavior that is patterned over time. As a corollary, this
behavior is also mutually predictable. Rules alone suffice for this
purpose if they are widely known and shared.
2. To de-escalate and resolve conflict, by curbing or eliminating its
violent expression. This function gives use to the opportunity to vary
the means. This can be exemplified by the use of regularized bargaining
and mediation. It may also involve ritualized conflict as a surrogate
for uncontrolled forms (e.g., verbal expression of hostility, duels, feuds,
ordeals, and "war" itself when detailed laws of war are operative).
This function requires the rule system associated with the first function
and institutional means for conflict management, particularly
institutionalized bargaining and manifest third parties.
3. To control deviation. This function is conventionally referred to
as the police function and is dealt with through the criminal law. While
this appears to overlap substantially on the conflict resolution function,
it is in fact rather different. Deviation from norms need not involve
conflict behavior; conflict behavior may or may not constitute
1M. BARKUN, LAW WITHOUT SANCTIONS: ORDER IN PRIMITIVE SOCIETIES AND THE WORLD
COMMUNITY 151 (1968). The author lists 6 formal characteristics of legal theory and also lists
the polymorphous qualities of law.
6G. GOTTLIEB, THE LOGIC OF CHOICE: AN INVESTIGATION OF THE CONCEPTS OF RULE AND
RATIONALITY 66-77 (1968). The author discusses reason as guided by rules, causing confusion by
thinking that the rule is the reason. He also discusses the process of reasoning as creating a link




deviance. Moreover, since deviation control depends upon rules and
since conflict resolution depends upon procedures and authorized
representatives of the community able to act in a coercive manner,
function three requires considerable less in the way of institutional
resources.
4. To set policy. This function utilizes legal rules to move a
community towards a desired end-state more specific and/or
comprehensive than that suggested by the attainment of predictability,
conflict control, or deviation control. Thus function four is char-
acterized by the presence of a rule'-making or legislative authority
in addition to the apparatus listed for the other functions. Tax laws,
which involve a substantial redistribution of resources, fall into this
category, although the complete articulation of a tax policy involves
other functions as well.
While these functions can be separately performed, none prevents the
performance of the others. The four functions cover a wide range of
human activities and require substantial resources for their cumulative
fulfillment.
This suggests that all social systems may not possess the ability to
perform all legal functions, nor should we expect them to. To assume,
for example, that international law performs the same functions as does
municipal law is to indulge in gross oversimplification. What is far
more probable is that the nature of the society in question determines,
at least in large measure, the variety of performable (as opposed to
merely desirable) legal functions. This is strongly suggested by Richard
D. Schwartz and James C. Miller through their finding that societal
complexity is systematically related to three fundamental legal
institutions: mediation, police, and counsel.7 As complexity increases,
institutions are added in sequential fashion. As a result, four types of
societies can be distinguished: those with none of the institutions; those
with mediation alone; those with mediation + police; and those with
mediation + police + counsel. Remarkably few societies appear to
deviate from this typology. Mediation and police, respectively, bear
strong resemblances to functions two and three listed above.8
In any case, the evidence is strong that societal complexity and the
complexity of the legal system are related systematically; legal
characteristics occur in some combinations but not in others.,
'Schwartz & Miller, Legal Evolution and Societal Complexity, 70 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 159
(1964).
'Id. at 163-64.
'While it is by no means central to my line of argument, the way is also left open for a theory
of legal evolution.
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On the basis of the functions listed above, we can distinguish five
possible legal systems arranged to form a scale running from the last
to the most complex:
1. No legal functions performed, logically possible but empirically
most unlikely.
2. Predictability.
3. Predictability + conflict management.
4. Predictability + conflict management + deviation control.
5. Predictability + conflict management + deviation control + policy
articulation.
It is also worth speculating that these five possible legal systems are
associated with differing levels of societal complexity, such that system
five would occur only in the most complex society, characterized by
such elements as the largest number of social actors, highest volume
of interactions, and most extensive role differentiation. The simplest
society would possess a legal system which would approximate system
two (since system one is unlikely to exist in any ongoing social group)
and the systems in between would occur in environments of ascending
complexity.
II. LEGAL FUNCTIONS AND THEIR SOCIAL AND POLITICAL MILIEU
At this point, the analysis of functions and the question of milieu
obviously intersect. We are accustomed to speak of both "international
law" and "the international system" in the singular, as if there were
one legal system and one system of international relations with which
we must contend. This imputed singularity certainly makes thought
and discourse easier. But there is no good reason to assume that either
law or society on the international level possesses the unitary qualities
so often attributed to them. While it is beyond the scope of my
discussion to analyze the reasons for these traditional usages, they are
generally attributable to three factors. First, it is simply easier to
impute a unitary character than it is to think in terms of multiple laws
and multiple societies. The use of unconscious simplifying assumptions
pervades political and legal discourse. We speak of "the United
States" and of "the American legal system," in each of which lines
of authority are clear, and control from the top is assumed. This may
or may not be true; certainly we do not employ these terms on the basis
of careful empirical research, but only on the basis of convenience.
What empirical research there is suggests that the boundaries of the
United States contain multiple legal systems that overlap and fre-
quently conflict. At the international level, where power is widely
[Vol. !: 19
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diffused and coordinating institutions are absent, the likelihood of a
gap between the terms of discourse and observed behavior is
correspondingly greater.
Second, a long intellectual tradition stretching back to the
spokesmen of natural law pushes us in the direction of a global
approach to international law and relations. It has become second
nature to view international events in a global perspective, just as
international norms are automatically conceived to possess global
validity. Third, there has in fact been a long-term tendency towards
greater interaction between Western and non-Western nations.
Processes, first of colonization, then of de-colonization, have been
mistaken for genuine globalization. There is, as a matter of fact, quite
as much evidence that receding Western influence in the non-Western
world will produce increased regional autonomy and differences.
Hence, at the very least, we ought to experiment with a more complex
type of analysis which recognizes the existence of multiple political and
legal systems." Nonetheless, we are still largely trapped in the thinking
of an earlier period when assumptions of singularity went
unquestioned.
Once we acknowledge and attempt to delineate multiple international
societies, each with its own structure of norms, we must be prepared
to find that different combinations of legal functions are actually per-
formed. Sub-global international communities can be expected to
differ markedly in their degrees of formal organization, size, cultural
homogeneity, value systems, interdependence, and life-span; in a word,
in their degrees of integration. Given differences along these dimensions,
we can expect differences in the functions which legal rules can effec-
tively perform. Thus three or four major varieties of legal systems
might be manifested at the international level in a single time period.
An analysis of the functions of international law of the kind
proposed assumes that international laws and international societies
manifest a "primitive" character, at least in comparison to their state
components. In other words, the characteristics of most international
"Hints of this existence have materialized from time to time, as in Morton Kaplan and
Nicholas Katzenbach's historical analysis of international law and politics in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries. Adda Bozeman's explorations of the cultural assumptions of legal thought,
and the general interest in the legal consequences of international regional organizations are also
noted. Kaplan discusses the "balance of power," how it developed through a treatment of the
international system as model and reality, how it fell apart, and how it was replaced by the bipolar.
system with international institutions. See A. BOZEMAN, POLITICS AND CULTURE IN INTERNA-
TIONAL HISTORY (1960); M. KAPLAN & N. KATZENBACH, THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 30-55 (1961).
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systems are closer to those of societies usually studied by social
anthropologists than they are to those of their own state components."
Stanley Hoffman, among others, has argued that this is a false
characterization since it fails to take into account the high degree of
legal and societal complexity within individual states. 12 In other words,
the complexity of the parts determines the complexity of the whole,
and, indeed, if this were true, the analogy of the primitive and the
international would be patently misleading. In fact, there does not seem
to be any obvious reason why complex components cannot be put
together to form a system that overall is simpler than any single part.
One explanation for this birth of apparent simplicity from a foundation
of complexity is the difficulty that occasionally arises in determining
exactly what the components are. More commonly, however, the
identity of the parts is known, but if they act corporately, their internal
complexity is largely irrelevant to the level of complexity of their
external relationships. Thus the differences in interactions among three
actors or ten actors may depend more on the numbers, common tasks,
and shared environment than on whether the actors are states,
corporations, universities, or individuals. We find no difficulty in
recognizing that the observable behavior of an individual is far simpler
than the sum of his internal physiological processes, yet the extension
of the same generalization to larger systems often proves unacceptable
to us.
III. CONCLUSION
Let us now return to the questions of relevance discussed above
under Part 1. In fact, when we ask about relevance, we wish to know
whether a given legal system operating in a particular environment at
a specified point in time is performing all the functions of which it is
capable. If some functions are not being performed, it remains to be
determined whether the cause lies in the failure of the legal system to
realize its potential or merely in the inability of the environment to
support certain kinds of tasks. Similarly, we cannot ask of a legal
system more than it can perform in a given milieu. If a legal system is
in this sense relevant to its society, and still fails to perform as we
"M. BARKUN, supra note 5, at 14-35; Masters, World Politics as a Primitive Political System,
16 WORLD POL. 595 (1964). These authors give reasons for comparing primitive and interna-
tional politics. There are similarities such as self help and violence. Analogies, as well as differ-
ences between international politics and a primitive, stateless system are explored.
"
2Hoffman, International Law and the Control of Force, in THE RELEVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL
LAw: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF LEO GRoss 21, 24-25 (K. Deutsch & S. Hoffmann ed. 1968).
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desire, our obvious recourse lies in efforts to change the character of
the society-a very different matter. The most disturbing failings of
international law are attributable to system-level characteristics;
that is, we ask of the society legal attributes which it cannot produce,
quite as futile as demanding of the Copper Eskimo that they have legal
counsel. A related but more subtle problem lies in the area of system
boundaries. At the international level, when we speak of "system," we
usually have in mind an all-encompassing global network of
interactions. The more comprehensive the system, the simpler and less
integrated it is likely to be, and, consequently, the lower the level of
legal performance of which it is capable. International legal systems
might be seen to do more, if they could be seen to operate in more
narrowly bounded communities where the levels of complexity and
integration are higher.
Is it not possible for a legal system to perform efficiently in the sense
of rising to its maximum level of functional performance and yet be
subject to considerable modification? To say that a legal system
performs certain specified functions tells us relatively little about the
content of legal rules. Functional performance necessarily gives rise to
considerable substantive leeway. The demands of predictability or
deviation control or policy articulation can be met by very different
kinds of rules. Hence, we can remain within the limits that a given
society sets and still seek changes in the content of the rules, so long
as those changes do not push the legal system to perform new functions
for which the means are not available. It ought also to be borne in mind
that the legal systems discussed earlier differ drastically, not simply in
the scope of their operations, but in the means available for their
conscious alteration. H.L.A. Hart's secondary rules,' 3 through which
conscious change is prescribed, are conspicuously absent in all but the
most complex systems. Put in another way, simple legal systems not
only perform simple tasks, but also lack internal machinery for task
expansion. Secondary rules of recognition, change, and adjudication
11H. HART. THE CONCEPT OF LAw 79 (1961).
Rules of the first type impose duties; rules of the second type confer powers, public
or private. Rules of the first type concern actions involving physical movement or
changes; rules of the second type provide for operations which lead not merely to
physical movement or change, but to the creation or variation of duties or obligations.
Id. The author states that law with its complexity and perplexing features can best be understood
by studying interplay between two basic types of rules, the primary being related to what human
beings are required to do and the secondary modifying or enlarging the first.
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introduce the potential for almost indefinite modifications in the legal
system; at the same time they produce the same problems of law-
society congruence alluded to earlier. The ability of the legal system
to change itself matters little if these changes have no effect upon the
society. International legal systems, where secondary rules are either
poorly developed or nonexistent, lack the ability to alter substantially
their own internal character, ignoring for the moment the greater
problem of societal impact. Hence we would do well to rein in our
aspirations, however anxious we may be to alter the normative status
quo. The consequent choice is between that which is highly desirable
but practically impossible, and that which may be marginally desirable
but within the realm of possibility.
